Pass the Amazon Web Services AWS Certified Associate DVA-C02 Questions and answers with ValidTests

The solution that will meet the requirements with the most operational efficiency is to create a new CodePipeline stage that occurs after the container image is built. Configure ECR basic image scanning to scan on image push. Use an AWS Lambda function as the action provider. Configure the Lambda function to check the scan results and to fail the pipeline if there are findings. This way, the container image is analyzed earlier in the CI/CD pipeline and any vulnerabilities are detected and reported before deploying to the EKS cluster. The other options either delay the analysis until after deployment, which increases the risk of exposing insecure images, or perform analysis on the source code instead of the container image, which may not capture all the dependencies and configurations that affect the security posture of the image.

The solution that will meet the requirements is to add a new stage to the pipeline. Use AWS CodeBuild as the provider. Add the new stage before the stage that deploys code revisions to the test environment. Write a buildspec that fails the CodeBuild stage if any test does not pass. Use the test reports feature of CodeBuild to integrate the report with the CodeBuild console. View the test results in CodeBuild. Resolve any issues. This way, the developer can run the unit tests automatically during the CI/CD process and catch any bugs before deploying to the test environment. The developer can also use the test reports feature of CodeBuild to view and analyze the test results in a graphical interface. The other options either involve running the tests manually, running them after deployment, or using a different provider that requires additional configuration and integration.

HTTP Status Codes: Each HTTP status code has a specific meaning in RESTful APIs.

HTTP 405 (Method Not Allowed): Indicates that the request method (e.g., POST) is not supported for the specified resource.

HTTP 401 (Unauthorized): Represents a failure to authenticate, which is the appropriate response for invalid login credentials.

The most secure and AWS-recommended way for a Lambda function to access other AWS services is to use an IAM execution role. Lambda assumes this role at runtime and receives temporary credentials that are automatically rotated by AWS. The developer attaches the necessary permissions (the existing IAM policy) to that role, and then configures the Lambda function to use the role.

Option B follows least privilege and avoids long-term credentials. It also integrates with AWS security tooling: IAM Access Analyzer, CloudTrail, and policy boundaries can all be applied cleanly. Because the policy already exists, this requires minimal extra work: create/choose the execution role, attach the policy, and assign the role to the function.

Option A is not correct because IAM policies are attached to IAM identities (users, groups, roles) — not directly to Lambda functions as standalone entities. Lambda permissions are granted through the function’s execution role.

Option C is insecure because it uses long-term IAM user access keys embedded in environment variables. Even if encrypted, this expands the blast radius, complicates rotation, and contradicts AWS best practices for avoiding static credentials inside code/runtime.

Option D is extremely insecure and noncompliant. Root user access keys should not be used for applications and should generally not exist.

Therefore, create and attach the existing policy to a Lambda execution IAM role and assign that role to the function.

Because the Lambda function is successfully triggered by the S3 event notification, the invocation path (S3 → Lambda) is working correctly. The failure occurs specifically when the function tries to write to DynamoDB, which strongly indicates an authorization problem rather than an invocation, scaling, or infrastructure issue.

In AWS, a Lambda function interacts with other services by using its execution role (an IAM role). AWS documentation explains that a Lambda function must have explicit IAM permissions to call downstream services such as DynamoDB. To write items, the role typically needs actions like dynamodb:PutItem (and sometimes dynamodb:UpdateItem, dynamodb:BatchWriteItem, depending on code behavior) on the target table resource ARN. If these permissions are missing or scoped incorrectly, DynamoDB returns an AccessDeniedException (or similar) and the function fails at the write step.

Option A is unlikely because exceeding concurrency would typically prevent invocation or cause throttling at the Lambda service level, not selectively fail only at DynamoDB write time after the function begins executing.

Option B is incorrect: DynamoDB does not require a GSI to support writes. GSIs are for alternate query access patterns, not mandatory for write operations.

Option D is incorrect because DynamoDB is a regional service, not tied to a single Availability Zone, and Lambda does not need to be “in the same AZ” to access it.

Therefore, the most likely cause is that the Lambda execution role lacks the necessary IAM permissions to perform DynamoDB write operations.

Why Option B is Correct:Setting the visibility timeout ensures that once a message is being processed, it is temporarily hidden from other consumers. The Lambda function must delete processed messages to avoid re-processing when the visibility timeout expires.

Why Other Options are Incorrect:

Option A: Message retention affects how long messages stay in the queue, not how they are processed.

Option C: Receive message wait time optimizes long polling but does not prevent re-processing.

Option D: Delivery delay introduces latency for new messages and does not address message re-processing.

AWS Documentation References:

Using SQS Visibility Timeout

Lambda Concurrency: The 'maximum concurrency' setting in event source mappings controls the maximum number of simultaneous invocations Lambda allows for that specific source.

Prioritizing Queues: Setting a lower maximum concurrency for the 'high priority queue' ensures it's processed first while allowing more concurrent invocations from the 'low priority queue'.

Batching: Batch size settings affect the number of messages Lambda retrieves from a queue per invocation, which is less relevant to the prioritization requirement.

This is a cross-account access pattern using STS AssumeRole. Account A owns the DynamoDB table and has created an IAM role (AccessPII) with permissions to access the table. Account A also configured a trust policy that allows principals from Account B to assume the role. That trust policy alone is not enough; the caller in Account B must also be allowed to call sts:AssumeRole.

Therefore, in Account B, the EC2 instance profile role (the role attached to the EC2 instances running the app) must have permission to assume the role in Account A. That is Option A.

Next, the application must actually obtain temporary credentials for the Account A role. The standard way is to call STS AssumeRole in the application logic (or use an SDK credential provider that assumes a role). This yields temporary credentials that have the permissions of the AccessPII role, allowing DynamoDB access in Account A. That is Option D.

Option B is not correct because granting direct DynamoDB table permissions in Account B does not grant access to a table owned by Account A unless Account A also grants access via a resource policy (DynamoDB resource policies exist but the scenario already sets up role assumption; the intended solution is AssumeRole).

Option C is incomplete/wrong: getting temporary credentials from the EC2 role alone gives permissions of the EC2 role in Account B, not the permissions in Account A. You must assume the cross-account role.

Option E is for IAM user MFA session tokens, not cross-account role assumption for an EC2 role.

Therefore, grant sts:AssumeRole to the EC2 role and call AssumeRole in code.

Requirement Summary:

Multi-tier app on EC2 + Aurora PostgreSQL

Must comply with least privilege and security policies

Need to manage credentials and API keys securely

Must support key rotation on demand

Evaluate Options:

A. Secrets Manager + AWS managed KMS keys

Best practice for secure secret storage

Supports auto rotation

Uses AWS SDK to fetch at runtime (secure, avoids hardcoding)

AWS managed keys are rotated automatically and easier to manage

B. Secrets Manager + customer managed keys

Also valid, but adds complexity

Since the question asks for LEAST development effort, AWS-managed keys are preferred

C. Store secrets in code

Violates all security best practices

D. Use SSM Parameter Store + AWS managed keys

Possible, but Secrets Manager is preferred when rotation is needed

Parameter Store does not natively rotate secrets

Secrets Manager: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/userguide/intro.html

Automatic key rotation: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/rotate-keys.html

Best practices for secret management: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/userguide/best-practices.html

Why Option C is Correct:Amazon Verified Permissions provides fine-grained access control capabilities, making it ideal for managing complex user permissions. It integrates with OIDC IdPs for authentication and allows applications to request authorization decisions dynamically. It is also easily adaptable to newer applications.

Why Other Options are Incorrect:

Option A: Cognito identity pools do not natively support fine-grained permission analysis or management.

Option B: Managing permissions in application logic adds significant operational overhead.

Option D: IAM roles are not designed for application-specific fine-grained access control and are more suitable for resource-level permissions.

AWS Documentation References:

Amazon Verified Permissions

The requirement is to test a new Lambda version without impacting the production API, and to do so with the least operational overhead. In API Gateway (REST API), the simplest pattern is to create a separate stage (for example, test) and use a stage variable to control which Lambda function version (or alias) the integration invokes.

With option B, the developer creates a new stage and defines a stage variable (commonly something like lambdaAlias or lambdaVersion). The API method integration URI can reference this stage variable so that each stage points to a different Lambda alias/version. The production stage (for example, prod) continues to call the stable version, while the test stage calls the new version. This cleanly isolates testing traffic and prevents any effect on the production REST API because stages have distinct invoke URLs and deployments.

This approach is operationally efficient because it avoids duplicating the API definition (new REST API) and avoids creating extra resources/methods that must be maintained. It also provides a repeatable process: future versions can be tested by updating only stage variables or alias routing rather than restructuring the API.

Why not the others:

A adds additional resources/methods and increases API surface area and maintenance.

C duplicates the entire API, increasing overhead and configuration drift risk.

D would impact production because it changes the integration used by the existing method.

Therefore, using a new stage + stage variables to route to the updated Lambda version meets the requirements with minimal overhead.